corporate governance vs leverage effect? case study : EQT by Audin, Jean-Richard
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Master Degree in 
Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
WHAT ARE THE MOST EFFECTIVE FACTORS OF VALUE CREATION IN LBO 
TRANSACTIONS: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VS LEVERAGE EFFECT?  
CASE STUDY: EQT 
 
CONFIDENTIAL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEAN-RICHARD AUDIN (MASTER STUDENT NUMBER: 27613) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
A Project carried out on the Master in Finance Program, under the supervision of: Professor 
Duarte Pitta Ferraz (NOVA - School of Business and Economics) 
Professor Philippe Grégoire (Louvain School of Management) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
2016 - 2017 
1 
 
Abstract 
“WHAT ARE THE MOST EFFECTIVE FACTORS OF VALUE CREATION IN LBO 
TRANSACTIONS: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE VS LEVERAGE EFFECT?  
CASE STUDY: EQT” 
 
The purpose of this project work is to identify the most effective factor of value 
creation, between implementing a good corporate governance structure and setting up leveraged 
transaction structures. With the help of internal documents obtained from EQT, we have 
challenged some theoretical aspects to the E.On Energy from Waste case, one of the most 
successful deal in Europe. The data available supports the view that the maximize return will 
be achieved using both factors of value creation considered in this work project, acknowledging 
nevertheless that most of value creation is coming from long term and sustainable growth. 
Keywords: 
Value creation / Leveraged buy-out / Corporate governance / Private equity  
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Introduction 
Nowadays, the private equity market is in full expansion and mutation. Consequently, 
it is much more difficult to distinguish from the competition than in the past and to provide 
competitive returns to investors.  
 The object of the project work is to perform a qualitative analysis of the value 
creation process used by EQT, a Swedish private equity house, illustrated by one of their 
investments: E.On Energy from Waste (“EEW”). After introducing some theoretical aspects 
and literature reviews, with the aim to understand the different drivers of value creation and 
leverage effects, we will discuss how these apply to EQT and more specifically on the EEW 
case. We will then discuss the outcome this review and try to understand what are the 
characteristics that EQT is promoting as elements of value creation and discuss how these might 
result in being a competitive advantage.  
 This paper begins with a theoretical part which introduces the leveraged buyout 
mechanism follows by the private equity profession and further discuss value creation realized 
by private equity houses. Then comes the practical part with, first of all, a presentation of EQT 
and its investment strategy followed by the analysis of EEW deal and ending by an analysis of 
the results. The conclusion summarizes the most important results for EQT of the research and 
suggests the future research opportunities.   
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Leveraged Buyout1 
Definitions 
“In a leveraged buyout, a company is acquired by a specialized investment firm using 
a relatively small portion of equity and a relatively large portion of outside debt financing. The 
leveraged buyout investment firms today refer to themselves (and are generally referred to) as 
private equity firms. In a typical leveraged buyout transaction, the private equity firm buys 
majority control of an existing or mature firm.” (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009, 
p.121). The phenomenon of leveraged buyouts (“LBO”) and Private Equity has become 
important in the eighties and has played an important role in the financial markets today 
(Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J.,2009; Sannajust A., Arouri M., Chevalier A., 2015). At the 
beginning of the twenty-first century, about one-fourth of the mergers & acquisitions activity 
was due to the buyout funds (Metrick A., Yasuda A., 2010).  
Frequently, leveraged buyout is achieved by implementing an acquisition structure. At 
the top of the structure, there is a holding company which activity is to only hold financial 
assets. The holding company, usually named NewCo or HoldCo in the jargon, enters into debt 
for the purpose of acquiring the target company (i.e. the company being bought out) and 
thereafter uses the cash flows generated by the activity of that company to repay the debt.  
The term leveraged buyout is a generic term which has several variants: 
- Leveraged Management Buyout (“LMBO”) refers to the situation where this is the 
current management of the company taking over using a leveraged buyout structure.  
- Management Buy-in refers to a situation where a management team is raising funds, 
most of the time with the help of external investors, to acquire the company with the 
view of replacing the current management team in place.  
                                                
1 Inspired by and based on: Vernimmen P., Quiry P., Le Fur Y. (2016). “Chapitre 50 – LBO”. In Finance 
d’entreprise, 1015 - 1032. Paris: Éd. Dalloz. 
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- Build-up refers to using leveraged buyout to take over other companies from the same 
sector to benefit from synergies.  
- Owner Buyout (“OBO”) refers to the situation where the majority shareholder 
repurchases the stocks from the minority shareholders by using a mechanism of 
leveraged buyout. 
The stakeholders in a leveraged buyout transaction 
There are four important stakeholders in a leveraged buyout transaction: the target 
company, the seller, the fund or the acquirer, the debt investor.  
First of all, before entering into a leveraged buyout transaction, it is necessary to 
identify the potential targets. Due to the particularity of using large amounts of debt, the targets 
should ideally present the two following characteristics:  
- It must generate stable and sufficient cash flows over time to be able to repay the debt.  
- It must not need important investments as the cash flows generated by the company 
will essentially be used to repay the debt financing.  
Consequently, the targets are often companies that are mature and which business is 
stable. As the financial risk is important due to the large indebtedness of the company, the target 
companies must have a low industrial risk. They are often operating in a niche sector with a 
comfortable position on the market and where entry barriers are high and substitution risks low, 
ideally being cash cows. However, it can be observed that with a decreasing risk aversion, some 
investment funds can identify others targets with a strong growth or with consolidation 
opportunities. They can also decide to invest in more challenging sectors where the revenue is 
more volatile and cyclical or where the investments could be important and the market can 
change rapidly.  
Secondly, the sellers who are interested to sell their company to a leveraged buyout 
fund can be divided in four main categories: 
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- The small and medium-sized enterprises willing to sell their business but not keen 
though to sell to competition nor to make an Initial Public Offering (“IPO”); 
- The companies that are willing to sell one or several subsidiaries or divisions;  
- Investment funds willing to exit and open to sell to other investment funds; 
- The “public-to-private” operations consist to use a leveraged buyout transaction to take 
the company off the market. It may be interesting for the company whose stocks are 
undervalued and shows low liquidity.  
Thirdly, we have the acquirer. In many instances, the acquirer is a leveraged buyout 
fund that have a specific expertise such as private equity houses, which will be further described 
in the chapter about Private Equity. These investment funds are usually marketing a high return 
(around 20 to 25%) since leveraged buyout transactions are much riskier than other traditional 
investments. This is also common practice that the investment funds are not investing alone. 
They can form a joint-venture when they invest together with another fund to a have better 
repartition of their risks or to be able to buy bigger companies. At other times, they invest 
alongside an industrial investor who has a minority position to benefit of his expertise in the 
industry.  
Finally, third parties’ debt financing, most of the time being a bank or credit/direct 
lending funds, agree to lend money to the investment funds to perform their leveraged buyout 
transactions. In general, for borrowings below 10 million euros, the debt is financed by one 
single bank, most of the time, the same bank of the target. When the amounts involved are 
higher, the financing is negotiated by the funds with a pool of banks or funds. Sometimes, this 
is taking the form of a stapled financing that is a pre-arranged financing negotiated by the seller 
with the banks and is offered to the applicants for buying the company.  
To obtain a high leverage, it is necessary to structure the financing with different levels 
of risks. In general, the structure of the financing is divided into three levels: 
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- Senior debt: the amount of the senior debt is in general from three to five times the 
gross operating surplus and is split in different levels according to their risks (level A, 
B, C) which interest rate is determined depending on the risk borne; 
- Junior debt: bonds and mezzanine loans constitute the subordinated debt. Due to the 
higher level of risk, the interest rate can be very high and the lender may request to 
implement of supervisory board to monitor the management of the company; 
- Equity : the amount of money being invested straight from the acquirer. 
This structure in 3 levels can be facilitated by a credit granted by the seller and/or a 
securitization of some target’s assets. In additional to the financing means of the holding 
structure, the operating company has also its own financing means, such as Revolving Credit 
Facility, acquisition facility and capex facility. This structure of the financing gives more 
possibilities: 
- To benefit from the leverage effect;  
- To obtain debt financing with a longer term;  
- To have more flexibilities in the repayment of the debt and, as a result, a more flexible 
management of cash flows.  
- To put in place operations that would be otherwise impossible if they were financed 
only by senior debt and equity.  
The exit of the leveraged buyout 
In many cases, leveraged buyout transactions have a limited time life. Indeed, investors 
being involved in financing the acquisition of the target expect to receive their return back in 
the medium term, i.e. between three to eight years. There are several exit strategies, but the 
most common ones are the Initial Public Offering (“IPO”) or the acquisition by another strategic 
buyer. Depending of the good performance of the target company, the exit strategy thought can 
be different. When the target company is performing well, the most common strategies are:  
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- IPOs : this option is not always the best because of the cost of the IPO but also because 
of the possible under-valuation by the market;  
- Acquisition by a strategic buyer: it may result in the best exist strategy, especially 
when potential acquirers show a strong interest for the company, leading potentially 
to a competitive auction process.  
- Secondary leveraged buyout: this happens when the company is bought by another 
investor who will in its turn implement another leveraged buyout structure, mainly 
other alternative investment funds.  
- The leverage recap: this consists in entering into a debt re-financing process to either 
increase the amount of debt financing or to benefit from an evolution of the market in 
order to obtain better financing terms. This is not, per say, an exit strategy because the 
fund remains the owner of the company but that gives the opportunity to partially 
return a portion of the initial investment.  
Unfortunately, some of the acquisitions will happen to not to be as performing as 
expected and lead to a distress situation when it comes to repay its borrowings. Two solutions 
are thus conceivable:  
- Take-over by the creditors: this situation happens when the company debt financing is 
too large to face the draft but the lender is of the opinion that the operating situation 
of the company is still sustainable; 
- Bankruptcy: this remains the worst scenario possible but would happen if the company 
does not generate enough cash flow to face the debt drafts and where no negotiation 
to find a refinancing plan is possible, through either capital injection or debt 
refinancing, with the different stakeholders.  
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Value Creation 
As we discuss below in the private equity section, there is often a value creation when 
a company is turned private by a PE fund. Several reasons can explain this value creation such 
as the governance model and investment structures that are put in place, the use of leveraged 
buyout, the concentration of the ownership … (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009). The 
academic studies about value creation through private equity transactions is relatively new 
(Achleitner A.-K., Braun R., Engel N., Figge C., Tappeiner F., 2010). However, this question 
about the creation of value is very important. Indeed, if the source of value creation comes from 
the incentive mechanisms implemented for the management and from the indebtedness that 
requires discipline to manage the company, it is no longer sufficient to differentiate from the 
competition (Jensen M. C., 1989 and Braun M. R., Latham S. F., 2007). In a more competitive 
environment, it is necessary to identify other sources of value creation to be able to give an 
attractive return to the investors. This new source of value creation could come from the board 
of directors implemented by the private equity firms when it buys a company (Braun M. R., 
Latham S. F., 2007).  
Leverage and value creation 
It emerges from empirical results in Europe that “Our key finding is that two-thirds of 
value creation can be attributed to operational and market effects, while the remaining third is 
due to the leverage effect.” (Achleitner A.-K., Braun R., Engel N., Figge C., Tappeiner F., 2010, 
p.17). The leverage effect depends on the size of the deal. For deals higher than 100 million 
euros, the leverage effect is much more important than for the smaller deals. On the opposite, 
growth in revenue is much more important for smaller deals than for larger. For their sample 
(206 European buyouts transactions between 1991 and 2005), Achleitner A.-K., Braun R., 
Engel N. , Figge C., Tappeiner F. (2010) obtained the results that are displayed in the table 1.  
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The table 12 shows a total creation value of 2.47 times money which breaks down the 
value creation as follows: 
- One-third of the value creation is due to the leverage effect and two-thirds of the value 
creation is due to operating improvements and market effects.  
- The EBITDA growth and the free cash flow (“FCF”) effect together represent 46% of 
the total value creation (1.13 times the money) while the leverage effect represent 32% 
(0.78 times the money). 
The leverage effect is due to the financial engineering. However, the higher return 
could be associated to a leverage or a risk premium. The improvement of the EBITDA and the 
FCF could be associated to the capacity of the PE fund to identify good market timings, to 
negotiate well during the deals but also the higher multiples could just be an indication about 
the future perspectives for the company (Achleitner A.-K., Braun R., Engel N. , Figge C., 
Tappeiner F., 2010). 
Achleitner A.-K., Braun R., Engel N. , Figge C., Tappeiner F. (2010) give also an 
analysis of the components of the EBITDA growth that is summarised in the table 22. The 
principal component of the EBITDA growth is the growth in revenue which represents 79% 
                                                
2 From Achleitner A.-K., Braun R., Engel N. , Figge C., Tappeiner F. (2010). Value Creation Drivers in 
Private Equity Buyouts: Empirical Evidence from Europe. The Journal of Private Equity, 13 (2), p. 21. 
Table 1 : Value creation drivers across the entire sample2 
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(0.60 times money) of the total growth. Comes after the margin expansion for 26% (0.20 times 
money). 
However, it is emphasised that: “[…] the negative combination effect (-0.03 times 
money) indicates that sales growth was achieved at the expense of margin deterioration on 
average, or vice-versa. However, this effect is of relatively small importance.” (Achleitner A.-
K., Braun R., Engel N. , Figge C., Tappeiner F., 2010, p.21).  
A slight difference can be observed between the larger deals, i.e. superior to 100 
million euros, and smaller deals, i.e. inferior to 100 million euros. Indeed, the leverage effect 
seems to play a more important role in the large deal but the unlevered times money is relatively 
the same for the large and small deals. When it come to the growth in the EBITDA, the 
improvement of the margin is more decisive for the larger deals than for the smaller ones 
(Achleitner A.-K., Braun R., Engel N. , Figge C., Tappeiner F., 2010).  
It has been noted that the periods of recession give the opportunity for the private 
equity firm to make good deals. Indeed, the median times money is different and higher (+5%) 
if the deals is taking place during a recession period instead (Achleitner A.-K., Braun R., Engel 
N., Figge C., Tappeiner F., 2010). 
 
Table 2: EBITDA growth drivers across entire sample2 
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Corporate governance and value creation 
As discussed, the discipline imposed by a larger indebtedness and the incentives for 
the management enable to boost the performance of the companies (Jensen M. C., 1989; Peck 
S. W., 2004 and Braun M. R., Latham S. F., 2007 and 2009). However, if private equity firms 
want to distinguish on this competitive market, they need to identify others source of value 
creation such as the corporate governance structure (Braun M. R., Latham S. F., 2007). Braun 
M. R., Latham S. F. (2007) thinks that: “Accordingly, for buyout firms and their investors, the 
success of buyouts may increasingly depend on having the right governance structure to 
achieve superior returns.” (Braun M. R., Latham S. F., 2007, p. 878).  Cumming D., Walz U. 
(2010) supports the same idea, the returns depend also on the corporate governance mechanisms 
(Cumming D., Walz U., 2010 and Cumming D., Siegel D.S., Wright M., 2007).  
On top of the role of control that the board of directors plays to mitigate the conflict 
of interests between the shareholders and the management, they could play a role in the value 
creation (Zahra S. A., Pearce J. A. II,1989 and Braun M. R., Latham S. F., 2007 and 2009). 
Indeed, the board of directors can bring expertise, experience that are essential to the improve 
the performance of the company and, as a result, the value creation. Moreover, the presence of 
representatives from outside the company is vital, even more when the environment of the 
company is uncertain (Zahra S. A., Pearce J. A. II,1989; Daily C. M., Dalton D. R., 1994  and 
Braun M. R., Latham S. F., 2007 ).   
There is a correlation between the background of the deal partners and the performance 
of the deal. “General partners who are ex-consultants or ex–industry managers are associated 
with outperforming deals focused on internal value-creation programs, and ex-bankers or ex-
accountants with outperforming deals involving significant mergers and acquisitions.” 
(Acharya V. V., Gottschalg O. F., Hahn M., Kehoe C., 2013, p. 368). That means that the deal 
partners who have a specific background in the industry are able to take key decision to improve 
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the firm internally (“organic strategy” (Acharya V. V., Gottschalg O. F., Hahn M., Kehoe C., 
2013, p. 371)) and impliedly its performance. Conversely, the deal partners who have a financial 
background have more success in the deal that requires an “inorganic strategy” (Acharya V. V., 
Gottschalg O. F., Hahn M., Kehoe C., 2013, p. 371) like mergers and acquisitions (Acharya V. 
V., Gottschalg O. F., Hahn M., Kehoe C., 2013).   
When a public company is bought by a private equity firm, the size of the board can 
be reduced and restructured in case it is too large. Indeed, too large board can imply a lower 
performance of the firm because of the agency costs (Cornelli F., Karakas O. 2008 and Braun 
M. R., Latham S. F., 2009). Conversly, these boards can also be restructured to increase the 
number of non-executive directors with a specific expertise in relation to the business of the 
target company (Braun M. R., Latham S. F., 2009). However, Cornelli F., Karakas O. (2008) 
further commented that the non-executive directors are replaced by the employees of the private 
equity house, preferring to use their own resources instead. They will use however their 
resources with parsimony as they are costly and their time is limited. In a nutshell, the 
involvement of the private equity firm and the size of the board will be more important if the 
target company requires a lot of expertise and supervision, not to mention the very high rotation 
of CEOs and other members of the board (Cornelli F., Karakas O., 2008)3. 
In the light of the above, the performance of the target company can be also improved 
by the discipline imposed and implemented by the PE house at the level of the corporate 
governance of the company (Cumming D., Siegel D.S., Wright M.,2007).  
  
                                                
3 More details about the evolution of the board when a company is bought by a private equity firm can 
be found in: Cornelli F., Karakas O. (2008). Private Equity and Corporate Governance: Do LBOs Have 
More Effective Boards?. Online on the SSRN website: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1102467&download=yes   
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Private Equity 
Definition 
“Private Equity is a collective investment scheme (fund) that invests in companies with 
the intention of obtaining a controlling interest, usually by becoming a majority shareholder, 
sometimes by becoming the largest plurality shareholder.” (Cumming D., Walz U., 2010, p. 
728).  
In the 1980s, there was an important transformation in the financial markets with the 
development of the leveraged buyouts transactions and the introduction of private equity (“PE”) 
houses (Jensen M.C., 1989). As financial intermediaries and, also, their day-to-day roles as 
board members and advisers, private equity firms increase their importance in the financial 
markets (Metrick A., Yasuda A., 2010 and Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009; Sannajust 
A., Arouri M., Chevalier A., 2015). One of the reasons of their success is that the structures 
implemented by the PE firms are more efficient than the typical public corporation structuring 
according to Jensen M. C. (1989). Indeed, in PE houses structure, the ownership is concentrated, 
the managerial compensations are based on performance, high use of leveraged capital 
structures and active governance. That is actually the opposite of the public companies where 
the ownership is diluted throughout a huge amount of shareholders, the leverage is not 
optimised and corporate governance is weaker (Jensen M.C., 1989).  
Typical characteristics of a PE fund 
Legal aspects 
PE is somewhat linked to leveraged buyout. These firms are specialized investment 
firms that use this operation to acquire companies by using a small percentage of equity and a 
large percentage of debt while usually keeping full control. The funds, acquiring the target 
companies, are raised through a Private Equity funds (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009). 
Generally, these funds are closed-end vehicles. That means that the investors cannot leave the 
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fund before the end of the fund. Their committed funds cannot be withdrawn during the lifetime 
of the private equity funds, on the opposite of an open-end funds where investors can withdraw 
at any time (Stein J. C., 2005). The funds raised by these private equity funds are take usually 
the form of commitments given by the investors at the time of their subscription to the fund. 
These are mainly used to finance the acquisition of the target companies and to pay a 
management fee to the PE house (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009).From a legal point 
of view, PE funds are organized as limited partnerships where the investors, contributing most 
of the funds, are the limited partners (the “LPs”) and the PE house, managing the fund, is the 
general partner (the “GP”) (Metrick A., Yasuda A., 2010; Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 
2009 and Vernimmen P., Quiry P., Le Fur Y., 2016). Apart from providing the capital, the LPs 
have a very low influence over the decisions taken by the GP during the lifetime of the fund as 
long as the basic covenants of the limited partnership agreement are followed (Kaplan, S.N. 
and Strömberg, P.J., 2009 and Vernimmen P., Quiry P., Le Fur Y., 2016). Amongst the common 
covenants, there are concentration limitations, limits on the type of companies being acquired 
and guaranties in terms of indebtedness of the fund (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009).  
Investors 
Typically, LPs are pension funds, high net worth individuals, insurance companies, 
institutional investors and endowments (Metrick A., Yasuda A., 2010 and Kaplan, S.N. and 
Strömberg, P.J., 2009). As general partner of the fund, the private equity firm usually commit 
at least 1% of the total commitment. The lifetime of a fund is typically 10 years and the fund 
has usually up to 5 years to invest the money committed by investors into companies (Kaplan, 
S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009). 
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Remuneration of PE houses 
As compensation for managing the funds, PE houses are remunerated in three different 
ways by the limited partners (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009). This remuneration has 
fixed and variable components (Metrick A., Yasuda A., 2010): 
- An annual management fee: which represents usually a percentage of capital 
employed, (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009).  
- Carried interest: which give to PE firms the right to obtain a share of the profits, almost 
always 20%, of the fund above a defined rate of return, called the hurdle rate and 
usually set to 8% (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009). 
- Deal and monitoring fees: these types of fees are sometimes requested to the 
companies under the control of that private equity house (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, 
P.J., 2009).  
To remain in business, most of the successful private equity houses raise a new fund 
every three to five years. In the case where the fund provides good returns, the limited partners 
gain confidence in the skills of the PE house and, as a result, the demand to invest in future new 
fund increases. To meet the demand, the PE has the possibility to increase their fees and keep 
the same size for the future funds or increase the size of the future fund. They may also combine 
these two possibilities (Metrick A., Yasuda A., 2010).  
Economical characteristics of PE deals 
It seems that the price paid by private equity firms to the sellers of the target companies 
is much lower than if the target company would be acquired by a public firm. The difference is 
on average 55% more. One explanation for this observation is a diluted ownership. Indeed, with 
a concentrate ownership, the management incentive to pay a lower price is much important than 
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in the case of diluted ownership (Bargeron L., Schlingemann F., Stulz R., and Zutter C., 2007)4.  
Typically, the private equity firms pay a premium of between 15% and 55% over the current 
stock price to acquire public companies and from 60% to 90% is financed by debt (Kaplan, 
S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009). This debt financing it structured with both junior and senior 
debt. Institutional investors buy different senior debts, securitize them and sell them to other 
institutional investors. The junior debt is usually financed by high yield bond or mezzanine debt 
instruments (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009 and Vernimmen P., Quiry P., Le Fur Y., 
2016). Thus, the remaining 40% to 10% is financed via equity injections using the money that 
was committed by the investors in the fund and via a participation of the management team of 
the target company (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009). 
Private Equity activity seems to be cyclical and driven by the market conditions on 
both debt and stock market. Another important factor is also the recent returns offered by the 
the PE house on their other funds (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009 and Vernimmen P., 
Quiry P., Le Fur Y., 2016). In particular, the level of debt seems to be more dependent on the 
conditions offered by the credit market rather than the optimal level of leverage for the firm. 
The conditions on the debt market play a role in the cyclical activity of the private equity firms. 
When the interest rates are low, the trend is to increase their number of investments. Conversely, 
when the interest rates are relatively high, the trend is to reduce them (Kaplan, S.N. and 
Strömberg, P.J., 2009).  Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) do also another observation. If the private 
equity firm performs well, the investors will be tempted to invest more capital in the next funds. 
However, the private equity funds seem to obtain a lower return when more capital is 
committed. As the future commitments are positively correlated with the return of the current 
                                                
4 More detail about the difference of price when a company is bought by a private or a public company: 
Bargeron L., Schlingemann F., Stulz R., and Zutter C. (2007). Why Do Private Acquirers Pay So Little 
Compared to Public Acquirers? NBER Working Paper No. 13061. 
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private equity funds, this is high likely that investors will invest less capital in the future funds 
because lower return would be achieved on funds with higher commitments. This pattern 
supports the boom and bust cycle that could be observed in private equity (Kaplan, S.N. and 
Strömberg, P.J., 2009). 
Exit strategies 
A private equity fund has a limited lifetime. This characteristic is an important point 
to consider for the exit strategy of the investments owned and is fully part of the private equity 
process. When a PE fund acquires a target company, it needs to think ahead about the exit 
strategy. As explained in the leveraged buyout part, the most common exit options are the 
strategic buyer, a secondary leveraged buyout and the IPO (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 
2009 and Vernimmen P., Quiry P., Le Fur Y., 2016). Following Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), 
the most common exit option is to sell the company to a strategic buyer and represents on 
average 38% of the exits. On second position, with 24% of the cases on average but becoming 
more important over time, the fund is exiting the position to the benefit of another private equity 
fund. In third position comes the IPOs representing 14% of the exits but being even less used 
over time (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009). Further to a report of Bain & Company5, 
this ranking (with different percentage) remains the same in 2016 but confirming however the 
increasing part of strategic buyers against the decreasing numbers of IPOs, leaving the sponsor-
to-sponsor in-between. On the sample used by Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), only 6% of the 
companies went to bankruptcy, mainly driven by high level of indebtedness. The authors 
however warn that is perhaps not representative of the real situation. Indeed, they have a 
remaining portion of 11% for “unknown” exits. In this portion, some of these cases may be 
                                                
5 Bain & Company (2017). Global Private Equity Report 2017. 
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hidden. Moreover, that could support the 23% of default obtained by Andrade and Kaplan 
(1998) (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009 and Andrade G. and Kaplan S. N., 1998).  
On average, the holding period is 6 years for the private equity firms but this holding 
period can vary and recently, it is observed that some private equity funds have a more short-
term vision.  However, a holding period of less than two years represents only 12% of the 
existing cases observed (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009). Following a Bain Company 
report5, the median holding period in 2016 was 5.6 years. 
Factors of value creation brought by PE houses 
Some authors argue that the characteristics and the structure put in place by the PE 
firms create operational and economic value (Jensen M.C., 1989). However, other authors don’t 
believe in this operational value creation. They argue that the private equity firms take 
advantage of tax breaks, reduction of asymmetric information, market timing and mispricing 
but don’t create operational value (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009). 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) identify three major areas of change that private equity 
firms operate when they acquire a company: financial, governance and operational engineering 
(Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009). To align the interests of the management and the 
LBO funds (one of the most common principal-agent problem), the funds often ask to the 
managers to invest their own money or to borrow money to invest into the company alongside 
the funds. These management incentives are an important characteristic of the changes that 
private equity firms implemented in the companies they acquired. Thanks to options, 
convertibles bonds and stocks, the fund give incentives to the manager which can lead to a 
leverage effect on their investment. That enables to share a part of the capital gain with the 
managers (Jensen M.C., Murphy K., 1990; Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009 and 
Vernimmen P., Quiry P., Le Fur Y., 2016). This practice is unusually observed amongst the 
public companies. This happened to be however a powerful incentive tool to reward the 
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performance of the management team and, by consequence, to reduce the conflict of interests 
that could exist between the management and the fund (Jensen M.C., Murphy K., 1990). 
Moreover, since the company is private, the management is also exposed to the illiquidity of 
their stakes. These two exposures reduce the risk of manipulation on the short-term performance 
and stimulate the management team to adapt a longer-term view to generate sufficient cash-
flows and sustainable performance (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009).  
Another conflict of interests between the management and the fund is the waste of 
money. Thanks to the leveraged operation, the debt reduces the discretionary use of cash 
available by the management thus decreasing the risk of using the cash flows in an inefficient 
way for the shareholders (Jensen M., 1986 and Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009). Since 
the level of indebtedness is high, the managers have a lot of pressure to generate liquidities in 
order to face the repayment of the debt. This is an additional incentive to have a more efficient 
organisation (Jensen M., 1986 and Vernimmen P., Quiry P., Le Fur Y., 2016). Although some 
authors sustain the idea that leverage allows for value creation thanks to the tax shield (tax 
deductibility of interests) (Kaplan S., 1989), the high level of indebtedness increases the cost 
of bankruptcy. Therefore, the benefit of the debt from a tax point of view can be greatly reduced 
by the financial distress costs (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009 and Vernimmen P., 
Quiry P., Le Fur Y., 2016). 
Regarding the corporate governance, private equity funds take much more part into 
the governance of their portfolio companies compared to what could be observed in a public 
company. It could be also observed that the size of the boards is usually reduced and the 
frequency of the meetings are more important (Cornelli F., Karakas O., 2008; Kaplan, S.N. and 
Strömberg, P.J., 2009 and Acharya V. V., Gottschalg O. F., Hahn M., Kehoe C., 2013). 
However, the reduction in size of the board when the public company becomes private will 
depend on the complexity, the size, the challenges and the difficulties of the target company. 
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When the management performance is below the expectations of the PE house, the latter doesn’t 
hesitate to replace the under-efficient managers (Cornelli F., Karakas O., 2008)6. 
When it comes to the operating performance, there are several empirical evidences 
showing that companies increase their operating performance while being owned by PE funds. 
For example, in the eighties, the American public-to-private deals showed an increase by 10% 
to 20% of their ratio “operating income over sales”, an increase of the ratio “cash flow over 
sales” by 40% and a diminution of the ratio “capex over sales” (Kaplan, 19897 cited by Kaplan, 
S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009). This point would be more detailed later on in this document, 
highlighting the relation between the governance and the operating performance of the 
companies owned by private equity funds. 
The leveraged buyout gives the possibility to benefit from an important tax shield. 
Following Kaplan (1989), 4% to 40% of the value creation could be explained by the tax 
deductibility of the interest. The tax savings will depend on the tax allowances available and 
the tax rate where the target company is located. A good average could be between 10% and 
20%. However, it is difficult to estimate exactly the impact of the tax deductions because they 
are depending on the parameters that can change over time (Kaplan, 1989 and Kaplan, S.N. and 
Strömberg, P.J., 2009).  
Another fact that could explain the operating improvements and value creation is the 
question of asymmetric information. Because of the alignment of interests between the PE 
house and the management, the management could be tempted to share specific information 
with the buying candidate in order to enhance the return for the PE house with the view of 
                                                
6 For a more statistical analysis of the evolution of boards when a public company is taken by a private 
equity firm, interesting article: Cornelli F., Karakas O. (2008). Private Equity and Corporate 
Governance: Do LBOs Have More Effective Boards?. Online on the SSRN website: 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1102467&download=yes   
7 Kaplan S. N. (1989). The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance and Value. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 24(2), 217 – 254. 
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getting good compensations for performance and/or keeping their own jobs. This will bring the 
PE house is a favourable negotiating position as opposed to the shareholders while discussing 
the price of the transaction. (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009). However, this could not 
be the only explanation of the operating improvements and value creation. The performance of 
the companies is often below the forecasts (Kaplan, 19897 cited by Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, 
P.J., 2009) and therefore the PE will, in many instance, replace the chief executive officer when 
taking over the target company and to renew the management team to boost the performance 
(Cornelli F., Karakas O., 2008). This means that the above discussed incentive for the 
management to keep their job is uncertain and that the new management team is probably part 
of the improvement of the performance, thus giving another reliable explanation for value 
creation. The boom and bust cycles of the private equity industry is most likely a key factor to 
justify the low performance of some PE funds which can be however mitigated by accessing 
privileged information (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009). Nonetheless, the access to an 
inside information is not the only reason of good performance but may well be due to their 
strong negotiation skills and to some good opportunities to benefit from market timing and 
mispricing (Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 2009). 
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Methodology and limitations 
Private Equity houses are not much inclined to communicate information about their 
portfolio companies, performance, funds, investment strategies, etc. with the public. However, 
after discussions with EQT, they allowed me to gain access to a limited source of information 
under some confidentiality conditions. The research aims for analysing the investment strategy 
and its value creation process as a competitive advantage or not. Moreover, they should enable 
to understand how a private equity house can create value. To pursue this objective, EQT asked 
me to analyse its general investment strategy, corporate governance model and illustrate by 
their EEW investment realized in their EQT Infrastructure II fund.  
The results of this qualitative research are consequently limited and restricted to my 
EQT data limited access and to informal discussions. Also, the requirements given to write this 
work project is another limitation on the number of portfolio companies being analysed. 
However, it is still a good starting point to understand the strategy and the corporate governance 
model of EQT and to also understand their process of value creation. Subsequently, the 
conclusion may drive the need to perform a deeper analysis about EQT and how EQT is creating 
value on the basis of a lager sample of investments to support the conclusions drawn at the end 
of the document.  
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EQT 
“Having a long-term, responsible and sustainable approach to ownership is EQT's 
way of creating value, for investors, in portfolio companies and society at large” (EQT 2017). 
About EQT. Online on the EQT website: http://www.eqt.se/About-EQT/ ).  
EQT is a Swedish private equity firm, founded in 1994 by together Conni Jonsson, 
Investor AB, AEA Investors (private equity group based in United States) and SEB8. Its mission 
is to invest “[…] in good companies across the world with a mission to help them develop into 
great and sustainable companies. EQT has three overall investment strategies - Private Capital 
(including Ventures, Mid Market, Equity) Real Assets (including Infrastructure and Real 
Estate) and Credit – guided by a responsible ownership approach and an industrial growth 
strategy” (EQT AB (2017). Fast facts. Online on the EQT website: http://www.eqt.se/About-
EQT/Fast-facts/). The firm is part of the Wallenberg network9. With around 290 investments 
advisors on a total of around 480 employees, EQT is present in 14 countries in Europe, North 
America and Asia. Beside their employees, they have a network of around 250 industrial 
advisors. Through 22 funds raised since 1995 for a total of EUR 35 billion, EQT has invested 
in around 170 companies and existed from around 84 of them. Besides to be invested in Private 
Capital, the funds raised are also invested in Real Assets and Credit. Among their investors, 
400 are institutional investors9. 
The EQT portfolio companies generates around EUR 19 billion in total sales thanks to 
110 000 employees. On average, the results obtain by a company during the ownership by an 
EQT fund are: an annual sales growth of 10%, annual earnings growth (EBITDA) by 11% and9 
the number of employees increases by 9%. EQT invest only in companies, areas and regions 
where they know that they have the necessary expertise to be able to implement a sustainable 
                                                
8 EQT AB (2017). History. Online on the EQT website: http://www.eqt.se/About-EQT/History/  
9 EQT AB (2017). Fast facts. Online on the EQT website: http://www.eqt.se/About-EQT/Fast-facts/  
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growth and development strategy. This is possible because the knowledge of EQT in strategic 
business development, structural change and financial analysis but also thanks to its industrial 
network. EQT claims to be a catalyst for the companies they acquired by helping them to make 
changes, transformation and permanent improvements in a purpose to make9 “great and 
sustainable companies” (EQT AB (2017). Fast facts. Online on the EQT website: 
http://www.eqt.se/About-EQT/Fast-facts/ ).   
Business model 
As explained above, the goal of EQT is to acquire companies, to help them to develop, 
to be great and sustainable companies, not only during the EQT ownership but also after, for 
the future owners. The implementation of the strategies is done with the collaboration of the 
CEO and board members who are often issue from the Industrial Advisors network of EQT. 
They are monitored by the investment advisors10.  
The main drivers for value creation by EQT are development and growth. To achieve 
its objectives, EQT put in place several strategies10 such as “[…] geographic expansion, new 
products, acquisitions and strategic re-orientation.” (EQT AB (2017). Business model. Online 
on the EQT website: http://www.eqt.se/About-EQT/Business-Model/). The essential of the 
returns are due to theses operational improvements10. 
To develop the business and to achieve the objectives, a consensus about the strategy as 
well as a total collaboration between the management and the board of directors is fundamental. 
It’s the key of the success. When a company is acquired by EQT, the first thing that they do is 
to appoint a board of directors which is going to implement the model of corporate governance 
of EQT. According to the situation, the management could be also reinforced11. 
                                                
10 EQT AB (2017). Business model. Online on the EQT website: http://www.eqt.se/About-
EQT/Business-Model/  
11 EQT AB (2017). Growth and development strategy. Online on the EQT website: 
http://www.eqt.se/About-EQT/Business-Model/Growth-and-Development-Strategy/  
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The value creation process is guided by the strategy put in place and there is a closely 
monitoring of the improvements. Typically, the strategic plan includes11: 
- Sales Growth: To achieve their objectives in market growth, EQT uses usually the 
market and product expansion, as well as the internationalization and bolt-on 
acquisitions that consists to acquire step-by-step competitors or other firms that could 
enable economies of scale but also improve the efficient the company11.  
- Operational Excellence: thanks to the access to the industrial expertise of EQT, the 
management receives a precious help to improve the results11. Moreover, when EQT 
acquires a company, they want that this company becomes “[…] best-in-class in such 
areas as production, customer relations and service” (EQT AB (2017). Growth and 
development strategy. Online on the EQT website: http://www.eqt.se/About-
EQT/Business-Model/Growth-and-Development-Strategy/). 
- Strategic Repositioning: The strategic repositioning consists in put in place a base 
which enables a rapid development. That goes through some divesting to focus on the 
core business but also investments in new technologies and using the changes in the 
industry11.  
- Optimizing Capital Structure: The optimization of the capital structure is possible 
thanks to the financial expertise of EQT. This optimization is realized with a long-term 
vision, in order that the company be ready for the future new owner after EQT11. 
EQT has a long-term vision for their investments. They sell the company once they have 
achieved their objectives for the development of the company. In general, the holding time is 
between 4 and 8 years with an average of 4.8 years. To exit their positions, EQT uses essentially 
the 3 usually ways being used by private equity funds. Up to 31 December 2015 they used12: 
                                                
12 EQT AB (2016). EQT Annual Review 2015. Karlskrona: Printfabriken. 
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- Trade sale (= purchase by a strategic or industrial buyer) represents 46%12 
- Secondary Buyout represents 33%12 
- Initial Public Offering (IPO) represents 17%12 
- Others represents 4%12 
These figures show that EQT exists from its position essentially by the trade sale 
followed by the secondary buyout and finally by the initial public offering12. 
EQT invests in sectors that they find attractive to put in place a strategy for generating 
long-term value. These sectors are essentially the sectors of 13 “[…] Healthcare, TMT, Services, 
Consumer Goods, Industrials and Energy & Environmental” (EQT AB (2017). Investment 
characteristics. Online on the EQT website: http://www.eqt.se/About-EQT/Business-
Model/Investment-Characteristics/). The sources of EQT investments are corporate for 35%, 
private/family firms for 30% and secondary buyout for 19%. Together, these 3 sources 
represent 84% of the EQT investments. The 16% remaining are composed of public for 10%13, 
privatization/government for 2%, management buyout for 1% and other for 3%. These statistics 
are for transactions closed by December 31, 2015. EQT mainly invests in Nordic region for 
58%, Deutschland, Austria and Switzerland (DACH) for 25%. Together they both represent 
83%. The 17% remaining are the Greater China for 7%, North America for 4%, rest of Europe 
for 3%, Central and Eastern Europe for 1%, Southeast Asia for 1% and rest of the world for 
1%. These statistics are for transactions closed by December 31, 2015. The size of the 
investments realized by EQT are split as follows: 23% of the investments are between 100€ and 
200€ million, 19% between 50€ and 100€ million, 18% between 30€ and 50€ million, 15% 
between 200€ and 500€ million, 14% between 15€ and 30€ million, 8% lower than 15€ million 
and only 3% higher than 500€ million. Finally, if we look at the investments by industry, EQT 
                                                
13 EQT AB (2017). Investment characteristics. Online on the EQT website: http://www.eqt.se/About-
EQT/Business-Model/Investment-Characteristics/  
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invest essentially in industrial and consumer goods. Both represent 48% of the investments with 
25% for industrial and 23% for consumer goods. After comes the TMT industry with 16% of 
the investments and healthcare industry with 15%. Services industry represents 9% and the 
energy & environmental industry 7%. At the end come the transport & offshore for 4% and 
financial industry for 1%. These statistics are for transactions closed by December 31, 201513. 
The industrial advisors network of EQT is one of their key competitive advantages. 
Around 250 independent industrial advisors form the industrial network of EQT. They come 
from different industry and region around the world and they bring an expertise that is an 
important plus value for the companies. The industrial advisors play a paramount role in the 
board of directors appointed by EQT and as consultant in investment decisions. They are going 
to accompany for the implementation of the strategy designed by EQT and to help the 
companies during the transformation and improvement process. Moreover, these industrial 
advisors are members of the EQT industrial network14 for many years. Some of them played a 
CEO role in old portfolio companies held by EQT. So, in addition to their expertise, they have 
also acquired experience to help companies to growth with the EQT corporate governance 
model in place. Several meetings are organized by EQT to ensure the knowledge is shared and 
professional development for the industrial advisors but also to ensure that everybody works 
together following the objectives of EQT. There is an on-going evaluation of the industrial 
advisors and new advisors are added when necessary to make sure that the industrial network 
has all the necessary expertise to complete successfully the strategies14.  
When EQT acquired a company, they appoint a board of directors composed of several 
independent industrial advisors, whose one of them is usually the chairman, and of an 
investment advisory partner. Together, they decide of the strategic plans to put in place and 
                                                
14 EQT AB (2017). Industrial network. Online on the EQT website: http://www.eqt.se/About-
EQT/Industrial-Network/  
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they control their applications. They make sure that the management team has all the necessary 
resources and help to manage the company in a good way to apply the strategic plans. The CEO 
is appointed by the board. This board is relatively small and its structure as well as its 
composition is adapted in function of the particular needs of the company. A small board would 
ensure a strong commitment of the board and the decisions can be taken more rapidly. In order 
to align interests of the board and the target company, EQT requests to the board and the senior 
management to invest into the company. Altogether, the board, EQT and the management team 
develop a business plan and a shared agenda to have a common state of mind and the clearest 
transparency as possible. Another characteristic that is specific to EQT is the Troika15. The 
Troika is an integral part of the corporate governance model that EQT implements in the 
companies that they acquire. The Troika is formed by the CEO of the company, the Chairman 
being and industrial advisor and the EQT partner in charge of the deal. The Troika is a non-
decision organ, its function is to challenge the CEO thanks to the expertise of the different 
members and to work together to achieve the same objective which is to have a company 
stronger, sustainable which will be able to continue to succeed even after that EQT sells the 
company. Finally, a continuous performance evaluation of the CEO, Chairman, Board of 
Directors and Investment Advisory Professional is realized once a year. This evaluation is 
fundamental to assess the performance but also to identify the needs of resources or expertise 
to achieve the goals of the strategy and to verify the adequacy with values of EQT. The results 
of the annual evaluation can have as consequences an evolution and modification of the board 
composition to assure the good evolution of the company in line with the objectives and 
philosophy of EQT15. 
                                                
15 EQT AB (2017). Corporate governance model. Online on the EQT website: http://www.eqt.se/About-
EQT/Corporate-Governance/  
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More than 400 investors invest into EQT funds. 28% are financial investors, 26% are 
Pensions or Sovereign Wealth Funds, 24% are Fund-of-Funds and Gatekeepers and the 22% 
remaining are Endowments, Foundations and Family Offices. The family offices are important 
for EQT, not only as investors but also for their participations to the Industrial Advisors 
Network. It is also interesting to mention that Investor AB is an industrial holding company and 
sponsor of EQT since inception. It invests in all the funds for a participation of around about 
10% in each. The investors come from around the world with 38% from the rest of Europe, 
26% from Nordic, 25% from North America, 7% from Asia Pacific and 4% from the rest of the 
world16. The relationship with the investors is important for EQT which wants to maintain a 
close relationship with them. For this purpose, they communicate in a transparent way and 
provide them with precise information. Moreover, once a year, EQT organise the EQT Annual 
Investor’s Meeting where CEOs, investors, Industrial Advisors, Investment Advisory 
Professionals are gathered to discuss in details of the different EQT funds but also to give to 
investors a full information about the market situation and outlook for each portfolio 
company16. 
  
                                                
16 EQT AB (2017). Investors. Online on the EQT website: http://www.eqt.se/About-EQT/Investors/  
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E.ON Energy from Waste - EEW 
In March 2013, EQT acquired 51% of EEW – E.On Energy from Waste shares via its 
fund EQT Infrastructure II further to a strategic decision of E.ON to sell their stakes in E.ON 
EEW branch. In April 2015, E.On further decided to sell their remaining shares to EQT 
resulting in handing over the whole ownership to EQT. EQT Infrastructure II fund was launched 
in 2013, currently active and whose capital committed is EUR 1.938 billion.  
EEW is the market leader in energy from waste in Germany, its main geographic focus, 
and operates also in the Netherlands and in Luxembourg. The headquarters are located in 
Helmstedt, in Germany. At that time, the company employs around 1284 people and operates 
through eighteen plants. EEW produces several types of energies from waste: electricity, 
process stream for industrial use and district heating. Thanks to its high technological plants, 
always at the top of the new technologies, EEW is one of the leaders of its sector. Its plants can 
treat around 5 million tons of waste making EEW a major actor in the development of 
sustainable economy in Europe. Locally, they play also an important role with its six TWh of 
production in energy. In 2014, EUR 539 million sales were realized by the EEW activities17.  
EQT Infrastructure II played an important role in the growth and development of EEW 
through strategic acquisitions, through a reinforcement of the management team and its 
corporate governance structure. Among the strategic acquisitions, EEW acquired IHKW 
Andernach, an incinerator of captive waste, in June 2014. In September 2015, EEW acquired 
NHKW Stavenhagen, a captive Energy from Waste, located in in the North-East of Germany. 
This firm had a contract with Unilever for the supply of steam required to ensure good 
operations of one of their food transformation factory17. Thanks to EQT, EEW has become an 
                                                
17 EQT AB (2017). EEW Energy from Waste. Online on the EQT website: 
http://www.eqt.se/Investments/Divestments/EEW-Energy-from-Waste/ 
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efficient firm with a long-term vision but also solutions for the management and 
transformations of waste17.  
The most important changes during the EQT ownership are, first of all, the 
implementation of the Troika introducing of their Industrial Advisors. In this case at hand, it 
went along with the appointment of a new CEO, COO and CFO as well as a reinforcement of 
the management team in place. Altogether, they improved the cost structure, the operational 
model and increased the plant utilisation, by example, in increasing amount of waste treated 
using importation as a secondary source of waste or by reinforcing the sales force17. 
As already mentioned, shortly after the acquisition by EQT Infrastructure II, a new 
CEO, Bernard Kemper, was appointed in 2014. Bernard Kemper was a member of the Board 
since 2013. With an education in Political Science and Law studies, he has a previous 
experience in energy and waste sector with RWE and Sulo. The new CFO appointed in 2013 
was Markus Hauck. He holds a master degree in Business Administration and has a previous 
experience in the industrial sector at Holcim. Finally, the new COO was Karl Heinz Müller and 
was appointed in 2013. Like Markus Hauck, he has also an experience in this industry at Alcoa 
and he is trained in physics. The Chairman of the Board implemented by EQT is Jürgen Rauen, 
the Industrial Advisor. Jürgen has a previous experience at Sulo and Veolia, two actors in the 
waste management sector.  
The EEW project represented around 9% of the committed capital in EQT 
Infrastructure II (EUR 1.938 billion) which is equivalent to an investment of around EUR 171 
million in equity.  
EQT decided to invest and to acquire EEW for several reasons. First of all, EEW is 
positioned as a market leader in Germany on the waste incineration market. The company 
stands out by its exceptional technical asset quality and its secured, strong cash flow generation 
through long term contracts with municipal and industrial customers. Thanks to its economies 
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of scale but also its excellent mastery in waste flow management, EEW can easily and 
successfully renew its contracts with its actual partners. EEW constitutes also an entry point for 
growth opportunities in the greenfield and brownfield. 
 
Table 3 : key performance indicators18 
During the ownership of EEW by EQT, the sales increased by around 10% between 
2013 and 2015 with an increase of about 5% per year. The net debt decreased by 14% between 
2013 and 2014 and increased by 21.64% between 
2014 and 2015. This increase is due to the 
purchasing of the 49% remaining by EQT from 
E.ON in 2015. The Net Debt / EBITDA ratio was 
respectively 2.75 in 2013, 2.20 in 2014 and 
2.43 in 2015. An important point to highlight is that, despite a more important Net Debt amount 
in 2015 compared to 2013, the ratio Net Debt / EBITDA decreased. the EBITDA between 2013 
and 2015 increased by 18.24% with an increase of 7.65% over the financial period 2014 and of 
9.83% for financial year 2015. The ratio 
EBITDA / Sales is 33% in 2013, 34% in 2014 
and 36% in 2015 which means an increase of 
the ratio by 3% over the period from 2013 to 
2015. Now, if we consider the pro forma 
                                                
18 Source: internal report dated 31 March 2016 (strictly private and confidential) – Original documents 
are available in the appendices 
Overall growth 2012 reported 2012 pro forma 2015 2012pf - 2015 
Sales EUR 522 million EUR 453 million EUR 565 million + 25% 
EBITDA 
(margin) 
EUR 187 million 
(36%) 
EUR 139 million 
(31%) 
EUR 201 million 
(36%) + 45% 
Employees 1,309 1,1165 1,285 +10% 
Business mix  
Waste throughput 4.4m tonnes 4.0 tonnes 5.0m tonnes +25% 
Time availability 89% 89% 91% +2pp 
	
Strictly private and confidential
• EEW is the market leading Energy-from-Waste company in Germany, 
also active in Luxembourg and the Netherlands
• With 1,050 employees the company operates 18 Energy-from-Waste 
plants and produces electricity, district heati g and process steam for 
industrial use
• The plants are modern facilities with state-of-the-art technology, 
frequently updated to meet the latest technological standards
• EEW operates an installed waste capacity of around 4.7 million tonnes
making an imp rtant contributi n to European sustainable economy and 
playing a vital part in the local energy infrastructure, producing in total 6 
TWh of energy
2
Leading Energy-from-Waste service provider in Germany
EEW Energy from Waste – Company Overview (1/4)
Company overview
Investment rationale
Historical financial development
Geographical & segment sales split
2%
8%
90%
EUR 
565m
3%
26%
16%
55%
EUR 
565m
• Leading market position in the German waste incineration market
• Exceptional technical asset quality 
• Secured, strong cash flow generation through long term contracts with 
municipal and industrial customers
• Strong position to successfully renew contracts due to economies of 
scale and waste flow management capabilities
• Platform to approach greenfield and brownfield growth opportunities
Other
Energy
O&M
Waste management
Luxembourg
The Netherlands
Germany
33% 34% 36%
565539514 489
402
468
201183170
EUR m
2014 20152013
EBITDA %Sales Net Debt EBITDA
Table 4 : historical financial development18 
	
	
	
	 Table 5 : geographical & segment sales split
18 
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figures19 the sales increases by 25% between 2012 and 2015 and the EBITDA increases by 
45%. For the same period, the number of employees increased by 10% with 1165 employees in 
2012 and 1284 employees in 2015. The waste throughput rose from 4.4m tons in 2012 (4.0m 
tons in 2012 pro forma figures) to 5.0m tonnes in 2015, which means an increase of 25%.  
In 2015, 90% of sales were generated from the German market, 8% from the Dutch 
market and only 2% from the Luxembourgish market. The 
sales were segmented in Waste management for 55%, Energy 
for 26%, 16% for O&M and 3% for other.  
The transaction occurred between December 2012 and 
March 2013. The enterprise value of EEW at the time of the 
acquisition was EUR 1,170m with a ratio EV / EBITDA of 6.3, 
Senior Debt / EBITDA of 2.9 and Debt / Equity of 78%. The 
process of selling EEW was highly competitive. During an 
auction, three potential buyers bided to acquire the company.  
The winner of the auction was a Chinese municipal government 
owned conglomerate Beijing Enterprises Holdings that acquires 
EEW back in February 2016. The enterprise value given by internal documents was then EUR 
2,032m. However, the enterprise value given by the multiple method with a ratio EV / EBITDA 
of 10.9 gave EUR 2,190.9m. The gross IRR was 81% and gross MOIC was 6.3 which means a 
return of 1,077.3m considering an initial investment of EUR 171m.  
During the ownership of EQT, several initiatives were taken to create value. Relating 
to the operational improvements, key operational KPIs (Key Performance Indicators) were 
improved such as the availability and the cost per ton but also, the centralization and internal 
                                                
19 2012 pro forma figures are adjusted for certain operations assumed to close down at the time of 
acquisition (two energy from waste facilities in particular). 
Table 6 : Value creation sources19 
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benchmarking. An effective market approach was developed through new sales structure and 
systems. Assets transformations also occurred with successful carve-out, an improvement of 
the risk profile, sales centralization and changes in customer approach. The successful carve-
out and improvement of the risk profile have allowed for a strategic repositioning. Moreover, 
two new plants acquisitions are realized during this period which played a role in the overall 
growth realized by EEW. The organic growth was assured through an improvement of the 
supply/demand situation in Germany and a stronger market positioning. Also, two plants should 
have initially closed. However, the implementation of a profitable business model enabled to 
save these two plants.  
The analysis of the value creation sources shows that 63% of the value creation is due 
to the strategic repositioning of EEW, 29% is explained by the leverage effect. The sales growth 
represents 8% of the value creation. Nevertheless, the margin expansion is as decrease of 1% 
percent.  
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Analysis 
Even though EQT is using the standard tools of a classical private equity houses to 
enhance the return for investors, EQT distinguishes itself by its philosophy, politic and strategy 
of investments. It does not limit itself to a classic value creation process only using leveraged 
buyout transactions and incentive mechanisms for the management but the business model of 
EQT is based on a value creation by investing in companies which have a potential to be 
developed and sustainable growth. The success of the investment strategy and business model 
of EQT are the proof that in a market more and more competitive, it is necessary to identify 
other sources of value creation, as mentioned by Braun M. R., Latham S. F. (2007). The 
outcome for EQT is to be a company in full expansion that reinforces its position and becomes 
a major actor on the private equity market as they just ranks at the 10th position of the PEI 300 
ranking in 201620. Moreover, their industrial approach encourages even sellers to negotiate with 
EQT instead of other private equity house such as Top Toy or Nordic Aviation Capital, EQT 
said. 
The business model of EQT is totally based on a collaboration between the different 
parties: management team, CEO and the Troika. Together, they build up a strategic plan to 
ensure everybody is working towards the same objectives for the company. In addition to the 
obligation of the management to invest in the company, setting up a common vision for the 
future of the company enables to reduce the risk of conflicts of interest and so, the principal-
agent problem.  
Moreover, EQT is strongly involved in the management of the companies that they 
acquire. When EQT acquires a company, the first thing they do is the implementation of a Board 
of Directors whose chairman is an industrial advisor from the EQT industrial advisors network 
                                                
20 Private Equity International (2016). PEI 300: Blackstone claims top spot. on the website: 
https://www.privateequityinternational.com/free_articles/pei_300__blackstone_claims_top_spot/ 
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this assures a total independency of the board as the Chairman and the CEO function are not 
hold by the same person. This phenomenon is often observed in USA. There is also the presence 
of an investment advisory partner from EQT. Together with the CEO, this tripartite forms the 
so-called Troika. This model of corporate governance applied to each company in the portfolio 
of EQT and its strong industrial advisors network is the characteristic and the competitive 
advantage of that private equity house. It ensures a very close monitoring and an alignment of 
the interests but also an access to all the essential resources to pursue the strategic plan and 
achieve the objectives. Indeed, the presence of the industrial advisors bring to the acquired 
company the necessary competences and is in agreement with Acharya V. V., Gottschalg O. F., 
Hahn M., Kehoe C. (2013). The results of this governance policy is a great success of EQT 
investments and also, the sustain development and growth of the companies even after the EQT 
ownership. EQT corporate governance model confirms the propositions of Braun M.R., Latham 
S.F. (2007) and Cumming D., Walz U. (2010) that a good structure can be a source of success 
in buyouts operations. However, Cornelli F., Karakas O. (2008) mentions that the active 
implication of the PE in the management of the firm is costly and limited because the PE houses 
involve their employees. EQT seems to get around the problem thanks to is industrial advisors 
network. EQT developed during long years a strong and trustful relationship with their 
industrial advisors. They are an integral part of EQT on who EQT can trust and base its strategy 
due to their long collaboration. This allows to reduce a lot the implication of the direct 
employees of EQT. Moreover, the cost remains the same that if EQT hire outside directors. 
EEW was analysed to illustrate the value creation process of an EQT fund. A part of 
this successful investment can be attributed to a highly competitive auction between tree 
potential buyers which, to a certain extent, was the consequence the implementation of the 
strategy and corporate governance model of EQT. This strong interest from the bidder was not 
only driven by the value created throughout the EQT ownership but mainly because this value 
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was created with a long term and sustainable vision which can be further carried out by the new 
owner. 
First of all, the Board was implemented and a strategic plan defined. Together, the 
CEO, the Board of Directors and the Troika identified tree pillars as value creation sources. 
Theses tree axes are the growth in sales, operational improvements and strategic repositioning 
to achieve sustainable growth. Throughout them EEW could assure a strong and sustainable 
growth. The analysis of the creation value sources showed that only 29% of the value creation 
was due to the levered effect. This result is below of the result obtain by Achleitner A.-K., 
Braun R., Engel N., Figge C., Tappeiner F. (2010) who supported that 33% of value creation is 
due to the levered effect. The essential of the value creation source (63%) was due to the 
strategic repositioning. This example illustrates very well the way EQT works and creates long 
term and sustainable value for the firms they acquire through their funds. The financial 
engineering is not central point of the value creation process, but is rather a way to be able to 
boost the return for the investors. They focus essentially on a development and sustainable 
growth thanks to the corporate governance model that they implement and their own expertise 
through their industrial advisor network. This expertise was brought by the appointment of a 
new CEO, COO, CFO and industrial advisor. All of them have a former experience in the 
industry, energy, waste sector. In particular, Jürgen Rauen, the industrial advisor appointed by 
EQT, has a previous experience at Sulo and Veolia, two actors in the waste management sector. 
Thanks to their expertise they were able to understand the market, identify the challenges and 
be able to capture the opportunities.  
As we discussed in the chapter related to value creation, the deal partner who has a 
specific background in the industry is able to take key decision to improve the firm internally 
while the partner that has more of a financial background will be key in restructuring the 
companies. Through the Troika model, EQT has found a way to take advantage of both 
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situations. The industrial advisor will bring the necessary knowledge from the industry the 
target company is involved in while benefitting from people having plenty of experience in 
restructuring companies. In such a situation, all conditions are met to optimize the possibilities 
to create value for the company. 
In this analysis, we demonstrated that a private equity house can create much more 
value in supporting the development and growth of their target companies than by simply 
playing with leveraged transactions, implying the discipline of managing the debt, and with 
management incentive mechanisms (Jensen M. C., 1989; Kaplan, S.N. and Strömberg, P.J., 
2009 and Braun M. R., Latham S. F., 2007). This principle is supported by a rapport of Bain & 
Company (2017)21 “While many playbooks started with a focus on cost reduction, the most 
successful ones today contain a strategic blend of cost and growth moves. Cost cutting is no 
longer sufficient on its own to generate strong returns. To reliably create value and obtain the 
desired multiple upon exit, a portfolio company must be set up to achieve pro table growth over 
the long term.” (Bain & Company, 2017, p.55). Moreover, in a world where the investors grant 
more and more importance to the good governance, the corporate governance model 
implemented by EQT in the acquired companies takes on its full meaning and clearly became 
a strategic competitive advantage. 
  
                                                
21 Bain & Company (2017). Global Private Equity Report 2017.  
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Conclusion 
In a market more and more competitive, the use of the classical techniques for private 
equity houses to create value is no longer sufficient to differentiate and to produce competitive 
returns (Braun M. R., Latham S. F., 2007). EQT seems to have anticipated this market change 
and positioned itself as precursor of its philosophy, politic and strategy of investments. The 
strongest strength of EQT is its corporate governance model, in particular, its unique industrial 
advisors network and its concept of Troika. This grants EQT an important competitive 
advantage in comparison to its competitors. This governance policy is multiplying the 
possibilities of value creation resulting in a great success for EQT and helped EQT to create a 
strong reputation amongst its investors. Together with the leverage structure, the corporate 
governance model implemented by EQT was certainly one of the key component of valuation 
creation which made the EEW case the most successful infrastructure deal ever in Europe. 
Despite the limitation of the researches to a single private equity house and to a single 
investment, this project work establishes the importance to deeper consider the value creation 
processes implemented by the private equity houses and not only focusing on financial technics 
to create return using levered structures. Although leveraged structure still helps to create a 
significant part of the return, 29% in the case of EEW, the majority of value creation is produced 
by active involvement in the management trying to achieve long term and sustainable growth 
in the business of the target company. Nevertheless, maximum return for investors can only be 
achieved by using a balances combination of both factors. This is even particularly true in this 
context of the PE market in complete mutation.  
The future of PE seems to turn into a more competitive environment where PE houses 
need to distinguish themselves to attract the attention of the investors in society where ethical 
behaviour seems to become a strong focus. EQT differentiates itself by using a long lasting and 
trustful network of industrial advisors helping out creating a long term and sustainable value 
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for company under EQT ownership. This resulted in being a strong competitive advantage 
compared to others PE houses willing to reproduce EQT’s value creation model.  
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Case study 
EEW
Strictly private and confidential
1
Leading energy from 
waste service provider in 
Germany 
CEO
Bernard Kemper
Chairman
Jürgen Rauen
EQT Responsible
Matthias Fackler
Investment: EUR 171m
% of EQT Infrastructure II: 14%
Acquisition year: 2013
Exit year: 2016
Sector: Environmental
Strictly private and confidential
• EEW is the market leading Energy-from-Waste company in Germany, 
also active in Luxembourg and the Netherlands
• With 1,050 employees the company operates 18 Energy-from-Waste 
plants and produces electricity, district heating and process steam for 
industrial use
• The plants are modern facilities with state-of-the-art technology, 
frequently updated to meet the latest technological standards
• EEW operates an installed waste capacity of around 4.7 million tonnes
making an important contribution to European sustainable economy and 
playing a vital part in the local energy infrastructure, producing in total 6 
TWh of energy
2
Leading Energy-from-Waste service provider in Germany
EEW Energy from Waste – Company Overview (1/4)
Company overview
Investment rationale
Historical financial development
Geographical & segment sales split
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90%
EUR 
565m
3%
26%
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55%
EUR 
565m
• Leading market position in the German waste incineration market
• Exceptional technical asset quality 
• Secured, strong cash flow generation through long term contracts with 
municipal and industrial customers
• Strong position to successfully renew contracts due to economies of 
scale and waste flow management capabilities
• Platform to approach greenfield and brownfield growth opportunities
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EEW Energy from Waste – Sourcing, execution and exit overview (2/4)
ExitSourcing & execution
Industry knowledge: 
• Local network with highly relevant IAs 
• Experience from other energy and waste 
businesses
• Early and thorough preparations
Preferred buyer status: 
• Strong industrial board and EQT governance
• Successful buyer despite initially failed process
• Good relationship with E.ON resulting in a 
partnership
Process:
• Highly competitive auction
• Sold to Chinese municipal government owned 
conglomerate Beijing Enterprises Holdings in 
February 2016
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Auction
1) Figures represent gross performance after deducting MPP/BPP proceeds and transaction costs
2) Based on pro forma 2012 results adjusted for major contract expirations expected at the time of acquisition
EV / EBITDA 
Senior debt / EBITDA
Enterprise value
Debt / Equity
EUR 1,170m
6.3x
78%
2.9x
Financial development:
Exit statistics:
Transaction statistics:
Energy from waste subsidiary of large German utility transformed into independent 
market and technology leader
Environmental
Strictly private and confidential 4
Value creation sources
Energy from waste subsidiary of large German utility transformed into independent 
market and technology leader
EEW Energy from Waste – Value Creation (3/4)
Results
+25%
Pro-forma1 cumulative 
sales growth
+45%
Pro-forma1 cumulative 
EBITDA growth
Value creation initiatives
+10%
Cumulative FTE growth
Growth
• Organic growth through improved supply / demand situation in Germany 
and stronger market positioning
• Acquired two plants in Germany
• Implemented profitable business model for two plants originally planned to 
shut down
Operational improvements
• Improvements in key operational KPIs (e.g. availability, cost per ton)
• Centralization and internal benchmarking
• Effective market approach through new sales structure and systems
Asset transformation
• Successful carve-out
• Improved risk profile
• Centralized sales and changed customer approach
• Two additional plants acquired in Germany
29% 29%
26%
-1%
8%
28%63%
17%
Debt pay-down
Margin expansion
Strategic repositioning
Sales growth
Actuals Pro-forma
1) Based on pro forma 2012 figures adjusted for major contract expirations expected at the time of acquisition
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New management team and complementary board working hand in hand on value creation
EEW Energy from Waste – Governance (4/4)
Board of Directors Management team
Matthias Fackler, Board member (2013)
Other assignments: EQT Infrastructure Partner, Parkia
Bernard Kemper, CEO (2014, board member since 2013)
Previous experience: RWE, Sulo
Education: Political Science and Law studies
Jürgen Rauen, Chairman (2013)
Previous experience: Sulo, Veolia
Ulf Berg, Board member (2013)
Other assignments: MCV, NORD, Synagro
Previous experience: Sulzer, ABB
Anedeo Vaccani, Board member (2015)
Previous experience: ABB
Ewald Woste, Board member (2015)
Previous experience: Thüga, Mainova
Karl-Heinz Müller, COO (2013)
Previous experience: Alcoa
Education: Physics
Markus Hauck, CFO (2013)
Previous experience: Holcim
Education: Master of Business Administration
Detlef Hartmann, CHRO (2012)
Previous experience: E.ON
Education: Psychology
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EEW Energy from Waste
This presentation is being issued by the respective general partner, manager or management company (each, as applicable, the “GP”) of the relevant EQT fund. Any statement of belief contained in the presentation including those that relate to a 
portfolio company represent solely the belief of the relevant GP and does not represent the belief of any other person or entity. No reliance should be placed upon the contents of this presentation for the purpose of making an investment in an 
EQT fund. The information contained in this presentation is intended to supplement discussion between the relevant GP and an investor; the supplemental discussion is required for the information herein to be meaningful and complete. All 
financial and other analysis in this presentation has not been independently verified. This presentation contains commercially sensitive information which constitutes confidential information for purposes of the governing documents constituting 
the relevant EQT fund and therefore any disclosure made in contravention of such agreements by an investor in such EQT fund will result in a breach of contract and appropriate remedies being pursued against such investor. If a recipient of this 
presentation is not an investor in the relevant EQT fund then, by virtue of receiving the information contained in this presentation, the recipient is agreeing to be bound by the confidentiality provisions applicable to an investor in the relevant EQT 
fund. This presentation is for information purposes only and does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation or offer to purchase a security in any EQT fund. Any such offer or solicitation shall be made only pursuant to the private placement 
memorandum or other specified disclosure document of the applicable EQT fund.
Unless otherwise indicated, all internal rates of return (“IRRs”) and multiples of invested capital (“MOICs”) are presented on a “gross” basis (i.e., before deducting the priority profit share, “carried interest”, taxes, and any other fees and expenses 
that are borne by investors in the relevant EQT fund or by the EQT fund itself, all of which will reduce returns and, in the aggregate, are expected to be substantial). For a description of such fees, “carried interest” and expenses, please refer to 
the governing documents of the relevant EQT fund. Investors may upon request obtain a hypothetical illustration of the effect of such fees, expenses and other charges on such returns.
Net IRRs and multiples of total value to paid in capital (“TVPI”) are presented after deducting all priority profit share, “carried interest”, transaction costs and other fees and expenses (other than taxes borne or to be borne by investors, including as 
a result of an investor’s domicile).
As used throughout this presentation, and unless otherwise indicated, “Gross IRR” and “Net IRR” shall mean an aggregate, compound, annual, gross or net, as applicable, internal rate of return on investments. While a GP’s valuations of 
unrealized investments are based on assumptions that such GP believes are reasonable under the circumstances, the actual real ized returns on unrealized investments will depend on, among other factors, future operating results, the value of 
the assets and market conditions at the time of disposition, any related transaction costs and the timing and manner of sale, all of which may differ from the assumptions on which the valuations used in the prior performance data contained herein 
are based. Accordingly, the actual realized returns on these unrealized investments may differ materially from the returns indicated herein. Gross IRRs and Net IRRs are based on daily cash flows. Total IRRs are calculated based on the “time-
series” methodology. Further, this presentation may relate solely to one or more portfolio companies of an EQT fund rather than all portfolio companies of that EQT fund, the performance of which may materially differ from that contained in this 
presentation. Past performance is not a guarantee of future results and there can be no assurance that an EQT fund will achieve comparable results, that the returns generated by an EQT fund will equal or exceed those of other fund investment 
activities of EQT or that an EQT fund will be able to implement its investment strategies or achieve its investment objectives.
No representation is made or assurance given that any statement of opinion and/or belief or any views, projections or statements relating to expectations regarding future events are correct, that the objectives of any EQT fund will be achieved or 
that investors will receive a return of their capital.
This Presentation contains information that has been or may have been provided by a number of sources and has not been independently verified. Nothing contained herein shall constitute any representation or warranty and no responsibility or 
liability is accepted by the relevant GP, EQT or EQT Partners as to the accuracy or completeness of any information supplied herein. 
All information in this presentation is presented as of 31 March 2016, unless otherwise indicated.
Important Disclaimer:
Bernard Kemper
CEO
Jürgen Rauen
Chairman
Matthias Fackler
EQT Partners
EUR 171m
Investment
9%
of EQT Infrastructure II
2013
Acquisition Year
6.3x
Gross MOIC
Leading energy from waste service provider
in Germany
2016
Exit Year
EEW Energy from Waste
18
5m tonnes
6 TWh
Energy from Waste Plants
Processed Waste
Energy Produced
Helmstedt, DE
Energy
Germany
Headquarters
Industry
Geographic Focus
EUR 565m
36%
1,284
Sales
EBITDA Margin
Employees
2%
Leading energy from waste service provider 
in Germany with 18 state-of-the-art plants
EEW Energy from Waste
90%
8%
EEW’s energy from waste 
makes an important 
contribution to European 
sustainable economy and 
plays a vital part in the 
local energy infrastructure
EEW has significantly increased EBITDA by implementing a comprehensive operational 
excellence program and growing both organically and through acquisitions
The Transformation of EEW Energy from Waste
Overall growth 2012 reported 2012 pro forma 2015 2012pf – 2015
Sales EUR 522 million EUR 453 million EUR 565 million +25%
EBITDA (margin) EUR 187 million (36%) EUR 139 million (31%) EUR 201 million (36%) +45%
Employees 1,309 1,165 1,284 +10%
Business mix
Waste throughput 4.4m tonnes 4.0m tonnes 5.0m tonnes +25%
Time availability 89% 89% 91% +2pp
Value Creation
Value Creation Sources
28
%
63%
29
%
29%
17
%
-1%
26
%
8%
Debt Paydown
Margin Expansion
Sales Growth
Strategic 
Repositioning
Investment Results
Enterprise Value
EV / EBITDA 2015
EUR 2,032m
10.9x
Investment
Realized Gross Proceeds
Gross MOIC / Gross IRR 
EUR 171m
EUR 1,161m
6.3x / 81%
Increased sustainable revenues and profitability as well as improved risk profile driving exit 
valuation
Growth
• Organic growth through stronger market positioning
• Acquired two plants in Germany
• Implemented profitable business model for two plants 
orginally planned to shut down
Operational Improvements
• Improvements in key operational KPIs 
(e.g. availability, cost per ton)
• Centralization of operational excellence 
function 
• Introduction of internal benchmarking
Strategic Repositioning
• Successful carve-out
• Improved risk profilePro Forma Reported
Endnotes
Slide 2 – “EEW Energy from Waste”
1. EEW has the largest market share in the German energy from waste 
market based on Commercial Vendor Due Diligence report prepared 
by Roland Berger and trend:research dated November 2015.
2. Investment amount includes initial drawdown in 2013 and does not 
include the drawdown performed in 2015, which is expected to be 
recycled by the fund. % of EQT Infrastructure II and Gross MOIC 
calculated based on this amount.
Slide 3 – “EEW Energy from Waste”
1. Figures as of 31 December 2015
Slide 4 – ”The Transformation of EEW Energy from Waste”
1. 2012 pro forma figures are adjusted for certain operations assumed to 
close down at the time of acquisition (two energy from waste facilities 
in particular)
Slides 5 – “Value Creation”
1. Exit EV/EBITDA 2015 multiple is based on financials reflecting 
transaction scope (in particular excludes contribution of Interargem, 
which was sold by EEW prior to transaction)
2. Pro forma value creation analysis based on 2012 pro forma figures, 
which are adjusted for certain operations assumed to close down at 
the time of acquisition (two energy from waste facilities in particular). 
Reported value creation analysis based on 2012 reported figures.
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Investment
% of EQT Infrastructure II
Ownership
Acquisition Year
EUR 260m (1)
13%
84%
2013 / 2015 (2)
(1) Thereof EUR 171m for the initial transaction in 2013 and EUR 89m for the acquisition of the remaining 49% stake from E.ON on 30 April 2015
(2) Initial acquisition of 51% stake completed in 2013. Acquisition of the remaining 49% stake from E.ON completed in 2015
This presentation is being issued by the respective general partner, manager or management company (each, as applicable, the “GP”) of the relevant EQT fund. Any statement of belief contained in the 
presentation including those that relate to a portfolio company represent solely the belief of the relevant GP and does not represent the belief of any other person or entity. No reliance should be placed upon the 
contents of this presentation for the purpose of making an investment in an EQT fund. The information contained in this presentation is intended to supplement discussion between the relevant GP and an 
investor; the supplemental discussion is required for the information herein to be meaningful and complete. All financial and other analysis in this presentation has not been independently verified. This 
presentation contains commercially sensitive information which constitutes confidential information for purposes of the governing documents constituting the relevant EQT fund and therefore any disclosure made 
in contravention of such agreements by an investor in such EQT fund will result in a breach of contract and appropriate remedies being pursued against such investor. If a recipient of this presentation is not an 
investor in the relevant EQT fund then, by virtue of receiving the information contained in this presentation, the recipient is agreeing to be bound by the confidentiality provisions applicable to an investor in the 
relevant EQT fund. This presentation is for information purposes only and does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation or offer to purchase a security in any EQT fund. Any such offer or solicitation shall be 
made only pursuant to the private placement memorandum or other specified disclosure document of the applicable EQT fund.
Unless otherwise indicated, all internal rates of return (“IRRs”) and multiples of invested capital (“MOICs”) are presented on a “gross” basis (i.e., before deducting the priority profit share, “carried interest”, taxes, 
and any other fees and expenses that are borne by investors in the relevant EQT fund or by the EQT fund itself, all of which will reduce returns and, in the aggregate, are expected to be substantial). For a 
description of such fees, “carried interest” and expenses, please refer to the governing documents of the relevant EQT fund. Investors may upon request obtain a hypothetical illustration of the effect of such 
fees, expenses and other charges on such returns.
Net IRRs and multiples of total value to paid in capital (“TVPI”) are presented after deducting all priority profit share, “carried interest”, transaction costs and other fees and expenses (other than taxes borne or to 
be borne by investors, including as a result of an investor’s domicile).
As used throughout this presentation, and unless otherwise indicated, “Gross IRR” and “Net IRR” shall mean an aggregate, compound, annual, gross or net, as applicable, internal rate of return on investments. 
While a GP’s valuations of unrealized investments are based on assumptions that such GP believes are reasonable under the circumstances, the actual realized returns on unrealized investments will depend 
on, among other factors, future operating results, the value of the assets and market conditions at the time of disposition, any related transaction costs and the timing and manner of sale, all of which may differ 
from the assumptions on which the valuations used in the prior performance data contained herein are based. Accordingly, the actual realized returns on these unrealized investments may differ materially from 
the returns indicated herein. Gross IRRs and Net IRRs are based on daily cash flows. Total IRRs are calculated based on the “time-series” methodology. Further, this presentation may relate solely to one or 
more portfolio companies of an EQT fund rather than all portfolio companies of that EQT fund, the performance of which may materially differ from that contained in this presentation. Past performance is not a 
guarantee of future results.
No representation is made or assurance given that any statement of opinion and/or belief or any views, projections or statements relating to expectations regarding future events are correct, that the objectives of 
any EQT fund will be achieved or that investors will receive a return of their capital.
All information in this presentation is presented as of 31 March 2015, unless otherwise indicated.
Important Disclaimer
Leading energy from waste service provider with 4.9 million tonnes of processed waste
and 4,900 GWh (1) energy produced in 2014
Company Overview Sales 2014
• Headquarters: Helmstedt, Germany
• Industry: Energy & Environmental
• Geographic Focus: Germany and Benelux
• Financials: LTM sales EUR 547 million,
35.4% EBITDA margin (2)
• Employees: ~1,200
• Products / Services: Waste incineration and energy production 
in 13 owned and 6 operated facilities
• Sales Channels: Direct sales of EEW to its customers
• Customer Base: Municipalities and regional utilities, waste collection 
companies, industrial and end-customers
R
egion
Segm
ent
EEW Energy from Waste
EEW has the largest geographical coverage of all Energy from Waste 
companies in Germany
8%
Germany
Netherlands &
Luxembourg
92%
Waste 
Management
17%
53%
Energy
3%
O&M
27%
Other
(1) A gigawatt hour (GWh) of energy is equal to 1,000,000 kilowatt hours (kWh)
(2) As of 31 March 2015
• On 30 April 2015, EQT Infrastructure II completed the 
acquisition of the remaining 49% stake from E.ON
• On 30 June 2014, EEW successfully completed the 
acquisition of IHKW Andernach, a captive waste 
incineration facility on the site of the world's largest tin 
plate plant, owned by ThyssenKrupp
• Strong progress with implementation of operational 
excellence program and improving sales capabilities
− Cost saving initiatives and overhead restructuring 
largely completed
− EEW proceeded with reorganization of its sales 
structure and strategy with the aim of a higher level 
of integration and a coordinated market approach
• On 3 July 2014, Bernard Kemper succeeded Carsten 
Stäblein as CEO of the company
Market Development
• Waste market has developed positively
− Waste volumes increased further due to strong 
German economy and growing imports
− EEW processed 410kt (1) of imported waste in 2014 
(+50% YoY), primarily from the UK
− Combined with a stable capacity situation in the 
market, the higher waste volumes led to growing 
gate fees in all market segments
− EEW has been successful in renewing its municipal 
contracts at attractive gate fees
• Steam revenues exceeded expectations due to 
growing client demand. Heat sales somewhat affected 
by mild winter
• Electricity market prices mostly stable over the last 
year
− Higher waste volumes drove EEW electricity sales
− EEW continued to grow ancillary electricity sales
The waste market has developed well over the last months due to a strong economic 
environment in Germany supported by higher import volumes
Developments During Last 12 Months
Key Actions & Events
(1) Kt or kiloton is 1,000 metric tons
Higher than expected sales and profitability in 2014. Add-on acquisition financed fromstrong cash flow. 
Significant covenant headroom
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Financial Development & Position (EUR million)
Development vs. Plan Development Last 12 Months
3.0x
2.0x
1.0x
0.0x
500
400
0
March 
2015
1.9x
375
April 
2014 Net Debt / EBITDANet Debt
Rolling 12 Months
2015LE
323359
2014
408401
2013
468488
516501498 544539514
2015LE2013 2014
173159155
188183170
2015LE20142013
Actual (1)Original Plan
(1) Actual bar in 2015 represents latest estimate (“LE”). Net Debt 2015 LE has not been updated for the acquisition 
of the remaining 49% stake from E.ON (Net Debt 2015 LE post acquisition of the 49% E.ON stake would be 
EUR 498m)
Covenants as of 31 March 2015 (Actual / Covenant): Cashflow Cover (Adj. Cash Flow / Debt Service): 6.92 / >1.00, Interest Cover 
(Adj. EBITDA / Net Cash Interest): 15.83 / >3.91, Leverage Ratio (Net Debt / 
Adj. EBITDA): 1.80 / <3.39
Rolling 12 Months
560
540
0
547
200
180
0
194
EEW focused on executing full potential plan; increasing waste prices and market consolidation
remain key priorities
Market Dynamics & Development
• Continued positive market environment with the ability to further increase gate 
fees due to a strong volume situation
• Electricity prices expected to remain on low level short-term. A recovery is only 
expected mid-term after the shut down of German nuclear plants
• Heat and steam markets expected to remain stable
Key Priorities & Actions
• Following implementation of the initial value creation plan, EEW has developed 
a comprehensive full potential plan and has started implementation
• Main measures include capacity extensions, improvements in purchasing and 
operations as well as optimization of waste flow logistics and energy revenues
• Continue active participation in the consolidation of the German market and 
neighboring countries
Outlook
Source: Pöyry Q1 2015 Energy Market Quarterly Analysis
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Investment 
% of EQT Infrastructure II 
Ownership (1) 
Acquisition Year 
EUR 171m 
9% 
51% 
2013 
 
(1) 51% reflects ownership regarding governance at HoldCo level with E.ON; EQT Infrastructure II economic ownership is 43% as of 31 March 2014 
This presentation is being issued by the general partner, manager or management company, as applicable, (the “GP”) of the relevant EQT fund. Any statement of belief contained in the presentation 
including those that relate to a portfolio company represent solely the belief of the GP and does not represent the belief of any other person or entity. No reliance should be placed upon the contents 
of this presentation for the purpose of making an investment in an EQT fund. The information contained in this presentation is intended to supplement discussion between the GP and an investor; the 
supplemental discussion is required for the information herein to be meaningful and complete. All financial and other analysis in this presentation has not been independently verified. This 
presentation contains commercially sensitive information which constitutes confidential information for the purposes of the governing documents constituting the relevant EQT fund and therefore any 
disclosure made in contravention of such agreements by an investor in such EQT fund will result in a breach of contract and appropriate remedies being pursued against such investor. If a recipient 
of this presentation is not an investor in the relevant EQT fund then, by virtue of receiving the information contained in this presentation, the recipient is agreeing to be bound by the confidentiality 
provisions applicable to an investor in the relevant EQT fund. This presentation is for information purposes only and does not constitute an offer to sell or a solicitation or offer to purchase a security 
in any EQT fund. Any such offer or solicitation shall be made only pursuant to the private placement memorandum of the applicable EQT fund. 
Unless otherwise indicated, all internal rates of return (“IRRs”) and multiples of invested capital (“MOICs”) are presented on a “gross” basis (i.e., before deducting the priority profit share, “carried 
interest”, taxes, and any other fees and expenses that are borne by investors in the relevant EQT fund or by the EQT fund itself, all of which will reduce returns and, in the aggregate, are expected to 
be substantial). For a description of such fees, “carried interest” and expenses, please refer to the governing documents of the relevant EQT fund. Investors may upon request obtain a hypothetical 
illustration of the effect of such fees, expenses and other charges on such returns. 
Net IRRs and multiples of total value to paid in capital (“TVPI”) are presented after deducting all priority profit share, “carried interest”, transaction costs and other fees and expenses (other than 
taxes borne or to be borne by investors, including as a result of an investor’s domicile). 
As used throughout this presentation, and unless otherwise indicated, “Gross IRR” and “Net IRR” shall mean an aggregate, compound, annual, gross or net, as applicable, internal rate of return on 
investments. While the GP’s valuations of unrealized investments are based on assumptions that the GP believes are reasonable under the circumstances, the actual realized returns on unrealized 
investments will depend on, among other factors, future operating results, the value of the assets and market conditions at the time of disposition, any related transaction costs and the timing and 
manner of sale, all of which may differ from the assumptions on which the valuations used in the prior performance data contained herein are based. Accordingly, the actual realized returns on these 
unrealized investments may differ materially from the returns indicated herein. Gross IRRs and Net IRRs are based on daily cash flows. Total IRRs are calculated based on the “time-series” 
methodology. Further, this presentation may relate solely to one or more portfolio companies of an EQT fund rather than all portfolio companies of that EQT fund, the performance of which may 
materially differ from that contained in this presentation. 
No representation is made or assurance given that any statement of opinion and/or belief or any views, projections or statements relating to expectations regarding future events are correct, that the 
objectives of any EQT fund will be achieved or that investors will receive a return of their capital. 
All information in this presentation is presented as of 31 March 2014, unless otherwise indicated. 
Important Disclaimer: 
Leading energy from waste service provider with a broad and reliable customer base 
Company Overview Sales 2013 
• Headquarters: Helmstedt, Germany 
• Industry:  Energy & Environmental 
• Geographic Focus: Germany and Benelux 
• Financials: LTM sales EUR 519 million,  
  33% EBITDA margin (1) 
• Employees: ~1,280 
• Products / Services: Waste management and Operations & Maintenance 
  (O&M) services 
• Sales Channels: Direct sales of EEW to its customers 
• Customer Base: Municipalities and regional utilities, waste collection 
  companies and industrial- and end-customers 
   
Region 
Segm
ent 
EEW Energy from Waste 
EEW has the largest geographical coverage of all Energy from 
Waste companies in Germany 
Netherlands / Luxembourg 
9% 
Germany 
91% 
(1) As of 31 March 2014. 
17% 
Waste Management 2% 
Other 
Energy 
27% 
O&M 
53% 
The waste market has developed well over the last months due to a strong economic environment in 
Germany supported by a mild winter. Electricity prices remain under pressure  
Market Development Key Actions & Events 
• Waste market has developed positively 
 Waste volumes were strong due to good performance 
of the German economy 
 Contrary to past years, EEW did not experience a 
winter waste shortage due to mild weather conditions 
 Higher import waste volumes and planned outages for 
maintenance work in winter support utilization 
 Gate fees have stabilized on current levels with some 
price increases in areas with strong volumes 
 Several municipal contracts have been extended 
further stabilizing EEW’s revenue base 
• Heat / steam revenues somewhat affected by mild 
winter 
• Electricity revenues overall stable 
 Electricity prices have recently continued to decline 
 Higher volumes have largely offset lower prices 
 Growing market-independent ancillary electricity sales 
• Strong progress with implementation of operational 
excellence program and sales capabilities 
 Main initiatives target cost savings through improved 
processes and intelligent maintenance strategies 
 Newly envisaged sales structure aims for higher level of 
integration and an optimized market approach 
• Significant overhead restructuring program initiated 
 Centralization of administrative functions in one location 
 ~40% overhead headcount reduction 
• Negotiations with City of Bielefeld finalized successfully  
 Bielefeld has waived its preemption rights for two plants 
where they are a minority shareholder 
 EEW will continue to hold a controlling stake at least 
until 2017 
• Add-on acquisition of one further plant in Germany to be 
signed shortly adding EUR ~9m in EBITDA 
Developments During Last 12 Months 
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Higher than expected sales and profitability in 2013 lead to a significant decrease in net debt 
compared to plan. In compliance with covenants 
Development vs. Plan Development Last 12 Months 
Financial Development & Position (EUR million) 
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(2) 2012 figure is excluding costs of international development projects 
(1) Actual bar in 2014 represents latest estimate (“LE”) 
  
Covenants as of 31 March 2014 (Actual / Covenant): Interest Cover (Adj. EBITDA / Net Cash Interest): 9.1x / >3.7x 
       Leverage Ratio (Net Debt / Adj. EBITDA): 2.58x / <3.97x 
Breaks 
to be 
added 
later 
Breaks 
to be 
added 
later 
Breaks 
to be 
added 
later n/a n/a 
EEW focused on increasing waste prices to benefit from the strong volume situation in Germany; 
efficiency improvements and market consolidation remain key priorities 
Market Dynamics & Development 
• EEW is highly focused on achieving price increases in the waste market due to 
a continued strong volume situation 
 As of Q2 2014, EEW has already increased prices in some regions and will 
continue to evaluate additional price increases 
• Electricity prices expected to remain on low level short term. A recovery is only 
expected mid term after the shut down of German nuclear plants 
• Heat and steam markets expected to remain stable 
 
 
Key Priorities & Actions 
• Implementation of overhead restructuring program 
• Further implementation of operational excellence program 
• Implementation of new sales organization and strategy to secure high utilization 
of plants long term 
• Continue active participation in the consolidation of the German market and 
neighboring countries 
 
Outlook 

